Télégrammes et notes entre divers intervenants.

Textes extraits de Foreign Relations, 1941, Volume II 

Ottawa, November 3, 1941 - 6 p.m. 
The Canadian Government's worry about the possible misuse of the Saint Pierre-Miquelon wireless station has been accentuated by recent sinkings far to the westward of any previously reported. In the circumstance they desire to send some civilian wireless specialists from the Depart of Transport to Saint Pierre-Miquelon to controll all messages sent. If the Administrator agrees no problem arises; if he refuses there will be a strong demand here for unilateral Canadian action. (...) 

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton). 
(Washington) December 16, 1941

(...) I informed Mr Moffat that the President did not favor a policy whereby the Free French were permitted to move in on the St. Pierre-Miquelon situation, that in this specific instance this was the issue at stake but that if later the question arose as to the Free French moving in on other French territorial possessions in this hemisphere, that with reference to recent exchanges between Washinton and Vichy, in so far as it was foreseeable now the attitude of this Government would undoubtedly be the same. Ray Atherson 

Three Free French corvettes and submarine Surcouf under the command of Admiral Muselier entered early this morning to occupy St. Pierre-Miquelon. No difficulties anticipated. Pasquet 

1. On December 16th we had a telegram from the Foreign Office in which, after setting out the prospects of successful action in the islands, they say: "We are therefore informing the Free French Headquarters that we see no objection to their undertaking this operation."

In the same telegram they asked me to be sure that this action did not embarrass the United States Government and to give time for this said that they were asking de Gaulle to postpone the issue of orders for 36 hours.

2. The matter was put to the State Department the same day who referred it to the President, who said that he was strongly opposed to the suggested action.

3. On the 17th December, the Foreign Office telegraphed to say that the President's view had been reported to de Gaulle who agreed that the proposed action should not now be undertaken.

4. A telegram from the Foreign Office on December 19th said that in the view of the Chiefs of Staff nothing short of the
occupation of the islands "would be satisfactory from Military point of view. This course however now seems to be ruled out   by United States attitude."

5. We received this morning a message despatched from the Admiralty to the British Admiralty Delegation, Washington, as follows--

"Following has been received from Admiral Muselier. BEGINS:

"I have the honour to inform you that in compliance with order quite recently received from General de Gaulle and request of inhabitants I have proceeded this morning to Island Saint Pierre and rallied people to Free France and Allied cause with enthusiastic reception. ENDS.

2. Please inform his Majesty's Ambassador urgently. This action has come as a complete surprise to us."

6. From this it appears quite clear: (a) that the Foreign Office knew and approved the general authority given to the Free French headquartersto try their luck with the Islands, but that

(B) they held up the operation while the United States Government were being consulted, and that on receipt of information about the President's feeling they secured de Gaulle's agreement that the operation should not now be undertaken; and that   finally

(D) Muselier has gone off on his own with or without de Gaulle's knowledge and assent.

7. An alternative plan to ensure control of the wireless station at St. Pierre has been under discussion between the Canadian and the United States Governments for some weeks. On December 18th Mr. Welles said that he hoped the Canadian Government vvouid give immediate effect to this plan, which involved the use/force if the Administrator of the islands did not   agree to Canadian supervision of the station.

Our Chiefs of staff in London commented on this as set out in paragraph 4 above.

8. Since dictating the above I have just seen F.U. telegram 7243 (Flag "A"), which tells the complete story, and seems to place the blame very squarely on de Gaulle, who I see has issued a congratulatory telegram in London to Admiral Muselier and announced that a plebiscite is being held today.

9- I attach a note (Flag "b") giving all the information in possession of the F.O. on the agreement between the United States Government and Admiral Robert. 10. I am seeing Hull at six o'clock, and will let you know if anything of importance emerges. As our information was complete on both points you raised I lid not think it necessary to telephone to the F.O.

25th December, 1941

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 7243 of December 25th, repeated to Ottawa No. 2256.

My telegram No. 7008.

Admiralty received a telegram from Admiral Muselier dated December 24th in which he stated that "in compliance with the order quite recently received from General de Gaulle and the request of the inhabitants" he had proceeded on the morning of December 24th to St. Pierre and rallied the people to Free France and the Allied Cause with an enthusiastic reception.

2. This was a complete surprise to us since General de Gaulle had authorized an assurance to be given to us on December 17th that no orders for the operation had been issued and that it would not be carried out by the Free French Naval forces. You were informed accordingly in my telegram under reference.

3. Free French Copmissioner for Foreign Affairs was at once summoned to the Foreign Office and asked for an explanation. He admitted General de Gaulle had in fact given orders for the operation to be effected. His reason for doing so had been that when he gave the assurance mentioned in the second paragraph above he did not know the Canadian Government intended with the approval of the United States  Government to send certain personnel to St. Pierre in order to secure control of the wireless station by peaceful means and if  this failed by force. On learning this General de Gaulie had addressed a letter to the Foreign Secretary in which he protested  against such a decision being taken without consultation with him and had declared the National Committee would lose its  reasons for Existence if it agreed to forceful action being taken by the Allied forces on French Territory. General de Gaulle  had asked that his views should be brought to the notice of the Canadian Government. 'l'his was done by telegram on   December 24th. Free French Delegation in the United States had been already instructed to inform the State Department.A   summary of this letter went to you in my telegram to. 7216.

4. It was pointed out to Mons. De jean that General de Gaulie in his letter had not withdrawn his to try their luck with the Islands, but that

(B) they held up the operation while the United States Government were being consulted, and that on receipt of' information about the President's feeling they secured de Gaulle's agreement that the operation should not now be undertaken; and that finally

(D) Muselier has gone off on his own with or without de Gaulle's knowledge and assent.

7. An alternative plan to ensure control of the wireless station at St. Pierre has been under discussion between the Canadian and the United States Governments for some weeks. On December 18th Mr. Welles said that he hoped the Canadian  Government vvouid give immediate effect to this plan, which involved the use/force if the Administrator of the islands did not   agree to Canadian supervision of the station.

Our Chiefs of staff in Lonion commented on this as set out in paragraph 4 above.

8. Since dictating the above I have just seen F.U. telegram 7243 (Flag "A"), which tells the complete story, and seems to place the blame very squarely on de Gaulle, who I see has issued a congratulatory telegram in London

The Secretary of State issued the following statement today : 
"Our preliminary reports show that the action taken by three so-called Free French ships at St. Pierre-Miquelon was an arbitrary action contrary to the agreement of all parties concerned and certainly without the prior knowledge or consent in any sense of the U.S. Government. 
This Government has inquired of the Canadian Government as to the steps that Government is prepared to take to restore the status quo of these islands." 
Cordell Hull 

(...) The Admiral plans to keep the corvette Mimosa, his flagship, and the Surcouf in St.Pierre until the colony is running smoothly again and its protection assured. 
I then asked Admiral Museler what financial arrangements he expected to make to continue the supplying of this colony and he replied that the New York Free French committee was conduction negotiations to that effect but that in any event the General would be making suitable arrangements. This point, of course, has been brought up by several local residents but the Admiral is relying on Prime Minister Churchill's promise to finance territories coming under control of the Free French. 
Respectfully yours, Maurice Pasquet. 

My dear Mr. President:

After giving careful consideration to all of the circumstances in connection with the St. Pierre Miquelon situation and with a view to arriving at an acceptable solution I have drafted the enclosed suggested telegram to Admiral Leahy setting forth a formula for the settle- ment of the matter. My suggestion would be that before sending this telegram in the event you approve it the telegram be submitted to the British and Canadian Govern- ments for their concurrence.

Without specifically stating so this would amount to a trusteeship. It seems to me advisable to steer away from any specific statement implying a trusteeship, or an administration by the three Governments for the reason that we are likely to run counter to provisions in the Habana Convention which as you know provides for the administration of regions of this hemisphere under certain circumstances by the American Republics. I do not think that we should give the other Republics occasion to feel that we are circumventing the Convention through the establishment by the United States, Great Britain and Canada of an administration of the Islands.

On the question of bringing about the removal of DeGaulle's forces from the Islands I am sure that you have in mind our commitments to Vichy and Admiral Robert on which they have been and are now counting and to which they have referred. In your message of December 13 to Marshal Petain which Admiral Leahy transmitted textually to Marshal Petain you stated that

"You may rest assured that the Government of the United States under present circumstances and in view of the instructions which you have issued to Admiral Robert will continue to give full recognition to the agreement reached by our two governments involving the maintenance of the status quo of the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere."

Moreover in the letter which you handed to Mr. Mathews for transmission to Marshal Petain you stated

"I again repeat that as long as French sovereign control remains in reality purely French, subject solely to the limitations of the Armistice Agreement, the Government of the United States has no desire to see existing French sovereignty over French North Africa or over any of French colonies pass to the control of any other nation."

Admiral Robert has already referred in connection with  the St. Pierre Miquelon incident to your communication of December 13 and has stated that he regards this Government "as obligated to obtain the reestablishment of French sovereignty over St. Pierre Miquelon."

We have already discussed the application of the Habana Convention to this situation and I do not need to go into that here. I am confident, however, that the American Republics are watching the matter and will not be loathe to view our action with circumspection. 

If the proposed telegram meets your approval I shall at once take it up with the British and Canadian Governments. 

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull 

DRAFT OF COMMUNIQUE WHICH WOULD BW ACCEPTED BY GENERAL DE GAULLE

1. The islands are French and will remain French.

2. The present Administrator shall be withdrawn; the Administration of the islands shall be exercised by the Consultative Council.

3. The above-mentioned Council wil will agree to the appointment of Canadian and United States' officials to assist them in the operation of the wireless stations on the islands in the common interest of the Allies.

4. The Free Franch National Committee inform His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that they never intended that ships of the Free French Naval forces should remain in the islands, and that these ships will shortly resume their normal duties of attacking the enemy wherever they may find him.

5. The Canadian and American Government agree and undertake to continue economic assistance to the inhabitants of the islands, and the respective Consuls of those countries will conifer with the local authorities as to the DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON July 29, 1942. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Let me call your attention to the attached telegram No. 1099, of July 28, 5 p.m., from our Charge d'Affaires in Vichy, Mr. Tuck. This telegram refers to the telegram from Bern which reported, among other things, that Darlan was inclined to favor giving some French submarines to Germany to be operated by the German naval forces. In accordance with your suggestion, a telegram was sent to Tuck last night asking if he would endeavor to ascertain from frlendly sources in Vichy Darlan' s attitude toward turning over French submarines to the German. The attached telegram is, of course, not a reply to our telegram of last night, but is a voluntary report from Tuck of his comment on the Bern telegram. Enclosure: Telegram No. 1099, of July 28, 5 p.m., from Vichy.

General de Gaulle would agree te the draft Communique on the understanding (which would not be mentioned in the   Communique) that all parties agree:

1. That the Free French Administrator will remain but will be merged in the Consultative Council.

2. That the Marines remain. (This is return to the pre-Armistice status quo; the islands must have some defence against the enemy.)

3. The Council will be under the orders of the National Committee.

I refer to your memorandum of January 26 on the subject of the St. Pierre-Miquelon occupation. 
In view of the fact that certain policies are obligations of this Government relating to the war situation were materially affected on both sides of the Atlantic by the unexpected occupation of the St. Pierre-Miquelon islands by the Free French naval forces on December 2, 1941, this Government proceeded, in a spirit of friendly settlement which could be found acceptable by all concerned. This Government suggested a broad basic proposal, a copy of which is hereto attached. This proposal was in line with the policy we have continuously pursued to the present time - That of holding the Vichy Government to its assurances regarding the French fleet, the North African bases, and French colonial possessions. 
As you will recall, Prime Minister Churchill agreed in general with you and with me on this suggested proposal, conditional upon his ability to secure the approval of General de Gaulle. It now appears that Prime Minister Churchill was not able to obtain General de Gaulle's accord. The draft formula substituted by Mr. Churchill, referred to in his telegram to you, would not be of assistance to us in holding the Vichy Government to its assurances, nor would it appear to be acceptable to that Government. 
In view of the failure to achieve a general satisfactory settlement which would conform with the policies and obligations of this Government on both sides of the Atlantic, and in view of the paramount importance of furthering unity and harmony in the maximum cooperative war effort with Great Britain, Canada, and the other United Nations, I recommend that further negotiations or discussions of the matter be posponed for the period of the war.